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Of flutes, oboes and the
as if world of evidence law
By Richard Lempert
Francis A. Allen Collegiate Professor of Law and Professor of
Sociology, University of Michigan

m

eading Allen's article, I am reminded of a cold war parable I heard during the
1960s. It concerned a flute and an oboe who joined an orchestra one year and
immediately set to quarrelling. The flute was distressed because whenever it
was playing at its lyrical best the oboe would enter. drowning it out. The oboe was
affronted because its deepest, most sonorous passages were invariably ruined by the
high-pitched flute butting in. When the orchestra split up for the summer and these
quarrelsome instruments went their separate ways, the flute, as it angrily
contemplated the oboe, found itself stretching on tiptoes and trying to speak in its
lowest voice. The oboe, on the other hand, despite its annoyance with the flute, could
not resist speaking in falsetto and hunching over as it played. When the orchestra
reassembled in the fall. it had two new clarinets.'

The story comes to mind because Allen is a prominent Bayesioskeptic while I have
been labelled a Bayesian enthusiast,' yet I find myself agreeing with much of what
Allen says in his article which. though styled a 'preliminary inquiry' seems to be a
culmination of his thinking about the role of Bayes' theorem in understanding
evidence and proof. Yet. I don't think we have both become clarinets; rather, Allen is
sounding very much like an oboe. for he seems to be saying much that I have said all
along.'
Let me highlight areas of agreement. First, Allen agrees that there can be settings in
which Bayes' theorem is normative. Second, he does not deny that Bayes' theorem may
be useful as an analytic tool. These are essentially the premises on which my article
'Modeling Relevance' (Lempert, 1977; see also Lempert. 1988) rests; namely, Bayes'
theorem is a useful analytic tool for understanding the law's idea oflogical relevance
because it captures the way the law's fact finders should (not necessarily 'do') reason
about evidence.

~
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story was current during the so-called 'Kruschev Thaw' at the start of Lyndon Johnson's
Society programme and before the Gulf of Tonkin incident and massive escalation of the
Viet Nam war. Its point was that both the Soviet Union and the United States seemed to admire
features of the other and despite their competition and angry confrontations might be on
convergent paths.
2 1do not know where the terms 'Bayesioskeptic' or 'Bayesian enthusiast' come from, but I have no
better shorthand to define what are thought to be conflicting positions about how evidence is,
might be or should be processed.
3 This is not to say that there are not some double bassoons among the ranks of Bayesian
enthusiasts, with whom both Allen and 1 would disagree.
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Third, Allen allows that even at trials Bayes' theorem may provide fact finders with an
appropriate framework for making sense of statistical evidence and maybe even
certain non-statistical evidence. Using Bayes' theorem to present statistical evidence is
something I (Lempert, 1991), and others (Evett and Werrett, 1990; Evett, 1992b; Evett et
aI., 1992; Kaye 1993), have advocated when DNA evidence is offered, and perhaps when
other statistical evidence is presented as well (Lempert. 1988).
Fourth, Allen agrees that Bayes' theorem may be useful for juridical objectives other
than understanding or improving the way fact finders reason, and specifically as an
analytic tool.' This is the use I make of Bayes' theorem in my article 'Modeling
Relevance' (Lempert, 1977) and it is a use I defend in my article 'The New Evidence
Scholarship' (Lempert, 1988).
Finally, I agree with Allen that except in a few situations involving statistical evidence,
fact finders should not be instructed in the use of Bayes' theorem or told to apply
Bayes' theorem to non-statistical legal evidence (Lempert, 1988; 64-5). I also agree with
some of Allen's arguments regarding computational complexity, but like him do not
believe that this is the only reason why jurors should not ordinarily be encouraged to
employ Bayesian modes of evaluating trial evidence." But this does not move me
towards flutehood because I have never taken a contrary position. I made clear at the
end of 'Modeling Relevance' (Lempert, 1977: 1056-7) that there are good reasons for
not urging jurors to be formal Bayesians and that the descriptive utility of Bayes'
theorem for modelling juror reasoning is an empirical question. In later work
(Lempert, 1988: 65) I noted that the empirical evidence indicated that ordinary people
reasoning about even simplified legal problems were not intuitive Bayesians.
Being in the same section of the orchestra does not, however, mean that Allen and I
agree on everything. Allen, for example, disagrees with me or misunderstands me
When I argue that the human ability to chunk information allows us to treat an array
of evidence as one piece for Bayesian analytic purposes. This is neither inconsistent
with a Bayesian approach, which recognises that evidence may be decomposed in
varying degrees (Schum and Martin. 1982; Kadane and Schum, 1996), nor any great
feat. Consider that in Allen's non-Bayesian world, a trial fact finder assimilates all the
evidence presented and reaches a judgment about the verdict that taken together,
the evidence portends, given the burden of proof. Although this judgment takes the
form of an all or nothing assessment such as 'guilty' or 'not guilty: the fact finder
could presumably report its conclusion as a probability that the burden of proof has
been met,"
What I suggested in the casually written paragraph from an electronic communication that Allen quotes is that in cases where DNA identification evidence is crucial,

~A

Reconceptualization of Civil Trials', the article by Allen (1986),which my article, 'The New
Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof (Lempert, 1988) engaged, Allen's most
trenchant criticisms of Bayesianism were, unlike this article, analytic rather than empirical.
5 In the hands of experts operating at their leisure, Bayes' theorem may be a tool that helps make
sense of empirical evidence despite great complexities. See the marvelous book by Kadane and
Schum (1996).
6 People are used to speaking in probabilistic terms. Thus someone may say, 'I think the odds are
100 to 1 the defendant is guilty: another might say 'there's three chances in four the driver was
drunk'. Moreover, people seem to have no difficulty providing subjective probabilities of what
different legal burdens of proof mean (see Simon and Mahan, 1971) or in giving researchers
probabilistic estimates of the probative weight ofevidence or of sets of items of evidence (Schum
and Martin. 1982).
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the fact finder, before considering the implications of the DNA evidence, should
estimate on the basis of all the other evidence the probability that the DNA
proponent's burden of proof has been met.' This estimate provides a prior probability
that can then be adjusted in a Bayesian manner when the rarity of the DNA match is
captured in a likelihood ratio rather than presented in frequentist terms. There is
nothing illegitimate in this argument or particularly difficult about the task assigned
to the fact finder. If a fact finder can acceptably estimate probabilities of guilt for all
items of evidence taken together, as it must in Allen's world, surely it can do the same
for all items except one. Indeed, the Bayesian approach I recommend in the material
Allen extracted from our e-mail conversation is one he admits is valid.
As for what Allen suggests is a cavalier treatment of what in his view is an intractable

situation of conditional non-independence, this is seldom a problem with the topic of
my message, DNA evidence. The probability of a DNA match which is given to the jury
is usually conditionally independent of other evidence in the case, since it is the
probability that a random person would have DNAmatching the evidence sample and
not the probability that the defendant would have matching DNA. Where it is not
conditionally independent. the implications of the conditional non-independence of
a match should be taken into account whether match probabilities are presented as
frequencies or as Bayesian likelihood ratios.

But enough quarrelling with Allen. What is interesting lies in our agreement not in
our disagreement and in our ability to identify how we can agree on so much when
Allen has, before this piece. been tenacious in his criticisms of Bayesian approaches to
evidence law. while I have welcomed Bayes' theorem as an aid to clear thinking. I
believe that our considerable agreement is possible because much evidence law, like
the uses of Bayes' theorem that Allen criticises, lives in an as ifworld. By this 1mean
some law is written and courts often decide cases as ifthe frailties of human existence
and the substantive complexities of actual trial evidence did not exist. Thus, evidence
law often presumes that its fact finders have abilities that exceed the capacities of
most humans. Allen has his eye on the actual world of trials. I, and to a large extent
Friedman, are writing for the more abstract as if world of much evidence law.
In the law's as if world. jurors are able to follow a judge's instructions to disregard
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to them or to consider admissible
evidence only for a single narrow permitted purpose even when some other
evidentiary implications appear far more obvious than the inference the law allows.
For example. jurors are presumed to use information about an accused thiefs past
convictions to decide if the accused might be prone to lie but not as evidence that she
is prone to steal, though research suggests jurors cannot so limit the impact of what
they hear (Hans and Doob, 1976; Wissler and Saks, 1985). Judges do jurors one better,
for the law conceives of them as able to hear far more inadmissible evidence than
jurors typically encounter without being prejudiced by it. Indeed in the law's as if
world, judges can be trusted to ignore improper evidence even if they have not
explicitly recognised its inadmissibility. Both trial jurors and judges in this world are
able to distinguish truthful and accurate witnesses from lying or inaccurate
witnesses. even though body language and other demeanour cues are often

~
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also Friedman's well thought out argument in this volume that the value of Bayes' theorem
about. or even perhaps at, trials does not depend on the fact finder being able to
evaluate each individual item of evidence in Bayesian terms.

i~thinking
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ambiguous or misleading," Perhaps most astonishingly, jurors and judges are able to
listen to the conflicting testimony of honest scientists, all ofwhom have needed years
of advanced study to master their fields to the degree where the law will allow them
to speak, and though the law's fact finders lack expertise and may never have
encountered the issue before. they can decide accurately which expert's position has
the greater scientific validity,"
With fact finders capable of such feats, it is not surprising that in evidence law's as if
world. they can also be, for some purposes, perfectly rational fact finders whose
thought processes are appropriately modelled by Bayes' theorem. In particular, trial
judges in deciding issues of pure logical relevance are supposed to conceive of jurors
in this way. This. at least. is my reading of Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402. and
it is the premise on which my article 'Modeling Relevance' rests (Lempert, 1977).
It is no accident that evidence law has created an unreal world in which to operate.
Some scholars would see this as inescapable. Niklas Luhmann. for example, has
argued that all of society's primary subsystems (for example, the political, the
economic, the legal) can only operate on self-defined concepts and that it is the fact of
operating only on its own closed model of the world which makes the law a system
(Luhmann. 1985a,b,c,d). But it is not ethereal theory that has created this condition.
Practically speaking a judge's analytic tasks at both the trial level and on appeal are
considerably eased by the acceptability of referencing idealised abstractions of how
people treat evidence rather than their actual behaviour. Indeed. since people behave
differently and their behaviour is often poorly understood, the law can find itself in
trouble when it proceeds on an image of behaviour designed to approximate actual
behaviour rather than some idealised vision of how rational people act. Thus, where
courts attempt to make law that realistically appraises human behaviour, their initial
decisions are often followed by ill-disguised retreats that lead to bodies of precedent
that are neither behaviourally nor analytically consistent.
In Lockhart v McCree 476 US 162, 106 S Ct 1758 (1986), for example, the Supreme Court
withdrew the invitation it had extended in Witherspoon v nIinois 391 US 510 (1968) and
refused to consider the possibility that death-qualified jurors might have proprosecution biases on questions of guilt and innocence. After Lockhart. the law's world
is one in which death-qualified jurors are treated for legal purposes as if they were no
more likely to favour the state's case than a random group of people drawn from the
relevant community and not subject to death qualification. despite substantial
evidence to the contrary.'?
In Bruton v United States 391 US 123 (1968) the law uncharacteristically eschewed its as
if world of jurors who do as judges tell them for the empirical world in which jurors
example. a large body of work indicates that eyewitness confidence has at best a slight
I~- less
relationship to eyewitness accuracy, but confident eyewitnesses appear far more credible than
confident ones (Wells and Loftus, 1984).On demeanour evidence generally, see, for example,

Wellborn (1991).
9 See. for example. the w'R. Grace & Co. case discussed in Lempert (1993). This and my other
textural examples should not be read as suggesting that in evidence law's as if world. the
capacity of jurors is always overestimated. Indeed, the same jurors who can resolve knotty
scientific questions that leave experts divided cannot be trusted adequately to discount
statements attributed to people not in court, nor can they avoid pro-plaintiff biases if they learn
the defendant before them is insured.
10 Consider as a body the studies dismissed by the majority in Lockhart v McCree 476 US162. 106 S Ct
1758 (1986) at notes 4-12. See especially Cowan et al. (1984), Fitzgerald and Ellsworth (1984) and
Haney (19841.
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are unable to disregard the portion of one codefendant's confession that implicates
the other. But Bruton led to tangles which it has taken a stream of cases, some of which
return to idealised images of fact finders, to unravel. I point this out not to criticise
the court, but rather to defend myself and my argument that Bayes's theorem, which
admittedly presupposes an ideally rational fact finder, is a viable model for thinking
about relevance as the law conceives it and other issues as well. The unreality of the
law's assumptions about fact finders' capacities that are reflected in the Bayesian
model is not an aberration; rather it is the stuff of which much law is made.

Conclusion
If all Allen means to do in his article is to argue that jurors do not reason in a Bayesian
fashion and to conclude from this that Bayes' theorem is not a viable model of how
fact finders think, then I agree with him. I also agree with Allen that ordinarily trial
fact finders should not be encouraged to quantify and process the evidence they have
heard along Bayesian lines. Apart from special situations that Allen recognises, jurors
neither make nor can they be expected to make the kinds of estimates and
combinations of estimates which a Bayesian fact finder would make to evaluate
evidence. But if this is Allen's point, it is a small one, and I do not think it addresses
most of the uses which the so-called Bayesian enthusiasts have made of the Reverend
Bayes' theorem.
If Allen has the broader goal of moving evidence scholarship in the direction of
attempting to gain a better understanding of how jurors and judges actually reason
about evidence and reach decisions, I applaud his efforts as will, I am sure, the many
social scientists who have made this project their life's work. If the latter goal
underlies Allen's article, that is, if he wishes to challenge evidence law's as if world
through greater understanding of how legal fact finders process information and
make decisions, he is embarking on and is inviting others to join him in a truly radical
challenge to received law and, indeed, to ways of thinking about law. In doing so he
points to exciting paths for evidence scholars to explore. The effort, if taken seriously,
can pose a fundamental normative challenge to much of evidence law and so has the
potential for reformulating much of this body of rules. The idea of moving evidence
scholarship in this direction is not new, for it can be traced back at least to
Munsterberg (1908). What is noteworthy is for as keen an analytic lawyer as Allen to
move his attention from the analytic to the empirical" and to suggest that it is in the
empirical world where answers to profound questions about the shapes of trials and
the meaning of proof lie. Yet maybe it is not strange that Allen's work has taken an
empirical turn. As a social scientist who has long been interested in the empirical
aspects of trial fact finding, I can testify that focusing on the empirical is what oboes
like most to do.

111

Contrast Allen's attack on Bayesian approaches to trials in Allen (1986).with the empirical case
against Bayesianism he makes in his current article.
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